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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

The primary question presented for review is whether

Petitioner's petition raises the special considerations set forth
in Rule 46, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, governing review
of appellate court decisions by the Utah Supreme Court.
2.

A secondary issue presented for review is whether the

facts of this case, along with the proceedings that have taken
place, in any way present a question that should be considered by
the Utah Supreme Court.
JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals entered its decision on May 22,
1990.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-2a-4 (1986), and Rule 45, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
The only controlling provision which applies to the decision
to grant or deny a petition for a Writ of Certiorari is Rule 46,
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

That rule provides:

Review by writ of certiorari is not a matter of right,
but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only
for special and important reasons. The following,
while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the
Supreme Court's discretion, indicate the character of
reasons that will be considered:
(a) When a panel of the Court of
Appeals has rendered a decision in conflict
with a decision of another panel of the Court
of Appeals on the same issue of law; and
(b) When a panel of the Court of
Appeals has decided an issue of st^te or

federal law in a way that is in conflict with
a decision of the Supreme Court;
(c) When a panel of the Court of
Appeals has rendered a decision that has so
far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings or has so far
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court
as to call for an exercise of the Supreme
Court's power of supervision; or
(d) When the Court of Appeals has
decided an important question of municipal,
state or federal law which has not been, but
should be, settled by the Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Action.
This is a case involving a claim of medical malpractice

against Dr. Gerald N. Goodman and his employer, Bryner Clinic.
The Plaintiff claims that Dr. Goodman caused him to become addicted to prescription medications which resulted in the Plaintiff
losing his job, embezzling money from his employer, embezzling
money from the Mormon Church, and causing substantial related
damages, including the conviction of a felony (R. pp. 2-8).
The case was tried to a jury beginning October 4, 1988.
jury returned its Special Verdict on October 13, 1988.

The

The jury

found that Dr. Goodman and his employer were negligent but also
determined that Dr. Goodman's negligence was not a proximate
cause of the Plaintiff's damage.

The jury also found that the

Plaintiff was negligent, that his negligence was a proximate
cause of his own damages, and that the Plaintiff was more than
50% at fault.

(R. pp. 546-48).
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The District Court Judge James S. Sawaya entered his
Judgment on the Special Verdict on October 25, 1988.
(R. pp. 577-78).

The Plaintiff subsequently filed a Motion for

Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or for New Trial.
(R. pp. 549-61).

That motion was denied by Jtidge Sawaya on

October 31, 1988 and his Order denying the motion was entered on
November 9, 1988.

(R. pp. 591-92).

The Plaintiff subsequently appealed to the Utah Court of
Appeals.

The Court of Appeals filed its decision May 22, 1990

affirming the judgment of the lower court.

(Petitioner's Brief,

App. A ) . It is from the affirmance of the Court of Appeals that
the Petitioner seeks review.
B.

Statement of Facts.
The "Statement of Facts" set out in Plaintiff's petition is

blatantly distorted, often erroneous, completely disjointed, and
attempts to paint a picture of the Plaintiff as a young man who
was on the road to a successful career, morally without problem,
and who would have undoubtedly succeeded had he not fallen prey
to Dr. Goodman (and, later on, to Dr. Goodman's attorney's
devious and unethical defense).

The facts thit were actually

presented at trial are totally contrary.

Mr. Quistberg admitted

under cross-examination that he was a liar (TL pp. 234-242),
embezzler (T. p. 228), thief (T. pp. 286-87), perjurer
(T. p. 557), drug abuser (T. p. 240), and convicted felon
(T. p. 261). He admitted that he abused prescription medications
before he went to see Dr. Goodman (T. pp. 189^90, 498-501,

506-12), he admitted that he was dishonest before he ever saw
Dr. Goodman (T. pp. 371, 532-36, 560-62), he admitted that he
perjured himself on at least two separate occasions (T. pp. 55759, 564-66).

He admitted that he manipulated doctors and

pharmacists in order to obtain prescription drugs (T. pp. 51531).

He admitted that he embezzled more than $70,000 from his

employer (T. pp. 227-31) and more than $13,000 from his church
(T. pp. 286-87) .
The first issue presented by the Plaintiff at the trial was
whether Dr. Gerald goodman had failed to take an adequate history
and conduct a proper examination when he originally prescribed a
controlled substance to Mr. Quistberg for relief of headaches.
The Plaintiff's theory of the case was that from the date of that
original prescription, Mr. Quistberg became more and more dependent upon the medication which was prescribed by Dr. Goodman and
he continually had the prescription refilled.

That particular

prescription was always refilled at the same pharmacy and,
according to the pharmacist who was a co-defendant at the trial,
he would telephone Bryner Clinic to obtain authorization for
refills of the prescription as required by law.

Dr. Goodman

testified at his deposition and at trial, as did his nurses, that
neither he nor they ever authorized any refills of the prescription. (T. pp. 71-75)
According to Mr. Quistberg, over the course of several
years, he became addicted to the narcotic medication and began
seeking other medication from other physicians.

The record was

replete with prescription records from numerous pharmacies and
dozens of doctors (R. pp. 312-25).

Mr. Quistberg admitted,

because the record so indicated, that his drug seeking behavior
began well before he obtained the prescriptioh from Dr. Goodman
(T. pp. 189-90, 498-501, 506-12).
Mr. Quistberg was employed by First Interstate Bank and,
during the year 1984 embezzled more than $70,000 from his
employer.

It was after he was terminated that he attempted to

blame his overuse of medications for the embezzlement and his
poor judgment.

In spite of this, he continued to abuse medica-

tions, to manipulate doctors and pharmacies, and finally, to even
lie to his own expert psychologist, Dr. Michael Decaria (T. pp.
371-72), and his own attorney.

Further, on at least two occa-

sions when his deposition was taken, he perjured himself.

This

was admitted at the trial.
The Statement of Facts set forth by Petitioner refers to
various claims by the Plaintiff that the jury may or may not have
believed.

The fact that they found Dr. Goodman to be negligent

may have related to the claim that he did not perform a proper
examination or evaluation to begin with, to the original prescription for the narcotic medication, or to the failure to
closely monitor whether prescriptions were being refilled.

All

one can determine from the jury verdict is that they found the
doctor to be negligent.
In Petitioner's "Statement of the Case," on page 3, he makes
the claim that "plaintiff was not allowed at trial to ask the

doctor as to each refill, if he knew the condition then of his
patient, and what hazards were indicated in the patient's gradual
increase and frequency of refills."
the record.

Petitioner does not cite to

The reason he does not cite to the record is because

this statement is blatantly untrue.

The Plaintiff was not denied

the right to ask the doctor any questions at the trial of this
case.

In fact, he was interrogated intensely on cross-examination

by Plaintiff's counsel about each of these issues (T. pp. 71-76,
687-95, Supp. T. pp. 3-7).
Another example of Petitioner's attempt to manipulate the
facts to give this Court an improper impression is set forth on
page 3 of his Petition.

He states "Dr. Goodman was the only

doctor prescribing a highly addictive drug, the only doctor
prescribing anything from April to September 1983 . . . and
Plaintiff had seen no doctor and had no medications in the seven
months before Dr. Goodman first prescribed the Fiorinal #3. . • ."
In fact, from the prescription records that Defendants were able
to obtain, and these prescription records are undoubtedly incomplete, Defendants were able to show that Mr. Quistberg was
obtaining controlled substances as early as 1981. There were
prescription receipts for Tylenol with codeine, Empirin with
codeine, and Didrex.

In August of 1982, which was only two months

after Dr. Goodman prescribed Fiorinal #3, Mr. Quistberg was
obtaining drugs containing codeine from Dr. Haight.

In September

of 1982 he was obtaining drugs containing codeine from Dr. Van
Orden.

In February, March and April of 1983 Mr. Quistberg was
-6-

obtaining drugs from Drs. Barton and Haight.

According to

Appendix F, which is attached to Plaintiff's petition, one can see
the pattern of manipulation by Mr. Quistberg (Petitloner's Brief,
App. F, T. pp. 563-65).
The final point that Defendant would addjcess in this Statement of Facts concerns Petitioner's claim that Defendant perjured
himself during his deposition (and at the trial) and that he was
advised to do so by his attorney.

The issue is addressed by

Petitioner in Points I and II of his argument.

Petitioner

contends that during the Defendant's deposition the Defendant was
about to make an admission concerning authorizing refills for
medication when he was taken from the deposition room by his
attorney and advised to perjure himself.

A review of the depo-

sition transcript shows that this is just not true.

In fact, Dr.

Goodman had denied on numerous occasions that he ever authorized
any refills.

The question that was put to hipi was a hypothetical

question only and he appeared to be confused about the hypothetical question.

It was at this point in time that Dr. Goodman's

counsel attempted to give him some advise to clear up the nature
of the question.

Plaintiff's attorney refused to allow such

advise to be given during the deposition and so defense counsel
took a recess and met with Dr. Goodman in his| office (T. pp.
687-92).
This entire scenario was re-enacted in front of the jury and
they were given an explanation about what was going on by the
Court (T. pp. 687-95).

The only questions that the Court refused
-7-

to allow Plaintiff's counsel to ask or to be answered were questions concerning the conversation that went on between Dr. Goodman
and his attorney.

The Court sustained the objection based on a

claim of attorney-client privilege.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH RULE
49(a)(9), UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
THE PETITION DOES NOT STATE ANY SPECIAL OR
IMPORTANT REASONS WHY CERTIORARI SHOULD BE
GRANTED AS REQUIRED BY RULE 46, UTAH RULES OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
The rules of appellate procedure clearly state that "review
by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial
discretion, and will be granted only for special and important
reasons•"

Rule 46, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Plain-

tiff's Petition does not purport to state any special and
important reasons, and certainly does not enumerate any of the
four reasons set forth in Rule 46.
The Utah Court of Appeals decision, which is set out as
Appendix A to Plaintiff's Petition, cuts through the Petitioner's
attempt to distort the record.

Page 2 of the Opinion says:

Appellant has neglected to fulfill either aspect of his
burden on appeal. He merely refers us to evidence in
the 25 volume record that would support a finding contrary to the one actually made by the jury. In light
of appellant's failure to marshall the supporting evidence and to demonstrate its insufficiency, we decline
to consider further appellant's challenge to the jury's
finding in its Special Verdict.
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Clearly, the opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case is
not in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court, nor has the
Court of Appeals rendered a decision in this case that has so far
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court
as to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision.

These are the requirements of Rule 46(b) and (c)# Utah

Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Rule 49(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states
that a petition for writ of certiorari shall Contain with respect
to each question presented, a "direct and concise argument
explaining the special and important reasons as provided in Rule
46 for the issuance of the Writ."

In this ca$e, Petitioner makes

no reference to Rule 46 nor does its Petition comport with any of
the stated considerations governing review of certiorari as set
forth in Rule 46.
In Lee v. Provo City Civil Service Commission, 582 P.2d 485
(Utah 1978), the Court stated:
It has long been the law in this jurisdiction that
pleadings seeking relief by way of certiorari must
specifically designate the jurisdictional excess or
abuse of discretion claimed and that pleadings which
merely set forth conclusions are to be dismissed. The
reasoning behind the rule is simple. In the absence of
specific allegations, the nature and extent of the
review ceases to be limited and invites t^he Court to
substitute its judgment for that of the inferior
tribunal, board or officer.
In the instant case, it is incumbent upon the Petitioner to
plead in accordance with Rule 46 exactly what jurisdictional

excess he believes the Court to have abused.

Since the Peti-

tioner has failed to do so, there is essentially nothing for the
Court to review and his Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be
denied.
POINT II
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY AFFIRMED
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT.
A

*

The Court of Appeals Properly Determined that the Evidence
Supported a Finding of No Proximate Cause as to the
Defendants.
In medical malpractice cases, the Plaintiff has the burden

of proving that the defendant proximately caused the injury.
Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 1980); Hoooiiaina v.
Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 270 (1987).

In this case,

the jury returned its verdict finding that although the Defendant, Dr. Gerald Goodman, was negligent, his negligence was not a
proximate cause of the Plaintiff's injury.

As noted by the Utah

Court of Appeals, the trial court should be reversed only if,
when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
party who prevailed, the evidence is insufficient to support the
verdict.

Hanson v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988).

There

appears to be no claim in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari
claiming that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury
verdict.

There is, therefore, no reason to reverse the verdict.

Further, there was ample evidence in the record, from numerous
experts, which would support a finding that whatever Dr. Goodman
did not cause Plaintiff's injury and that Plaintiff himself
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caused his own injury.

Evidence was presented at trial that the

Plaintiff was dishonest and had drug seeking behavior before he
ever met Mr. Goodman.

There was evidence that he had credit

problems before he ever took Dr. Goodman's prescription.

The

Special Verdict of the jury clearly show that the jurors felt
that Mr. Quistberg was responsible for his own behavior.

That

finding, in and of itself, should render all of the arguments of
the Plaintiff moot.
B.

Defendants Deposition Conduct or "Misconduct" Purina the
Pretrial Deposition Is Not the Basis for a Reversal.
Petitioner has deliberately distorted the events that

occurred during a pretrial deposition of the Defendant,
Dr. Gerald Goodman.

He has accused Defendant's counsel of

suborning perjury and has accused the Defendant of perjuring
himself.

Such claims seem incredible in light of the fact that

Mr. Quistberg, himself, admitted on the witneps stand that he had
perjured himself on numerous occasions during two different
depositions.
What actually happened during the deposition occurred
because Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Sam King, was repeatedly
badgering Dr. Goodman about whether he would have refilled
prescriptions for Mr. Quistberg assuming a certain set of facts.
Dr. Goodman had repeatedly denied that he ever authorized any
refills of the prescriptions.

At one point, when Mr. King asked

another hypothetical question, Dr. Goodman appeared confused and
so counsel for Dr. Goodman leaned over to whijsper something in

his ear.

At this point, Mr. King became highly animated and

shouted at counsel for Defendant.

At that point, counsel for

Defendant insisted that a recess be taken. Mr. King refused and
leaped in front of the door of the conference room, barring
counsel and Dr. Goodman from leaving.

Eventually a recess was

taken and the deposition resumed.
Petitioner and his counsel claim that they were denied the
right to ask Dr. Goodman questions.

In fact, they continued to

ask Dr. Goodman questions about refilling prescriptions and got
the same answers they had received from Dr. Goodman throughout
the deposition —

that he never refilled prescriptions.

On page 3 of Petitioner's Brief, it is claimed:
Plaintiff was not allowed at trial to ask the doctor as
to each refill, if he knew the condition then of the
patient, and what hazards were indicated in the
patient's gradual increase in frequency of refills.
This is a blatant distortion of the facts. Mr. King was not
denied the right to ask Dr. Goodman about this at trial and, in
fact, did ask him on numerous occasions whether he authorized
refills.
The Court also allowed Petitioner's counsel to re-enact the
entire scenario that occurred at the deposition.
the deposition was read to the jury.

That portion of

One might even assume,

based on the jury's finding that Dr. Goodman was negligent, that
he actually did authorize refills on numerous occasions.
the jury did not find any proximate cause, and since this
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Since

argument does not go to proximate cause, then the argument means
nothing with regard to the merits of this case.
Pages 4 through 14 of Plaintiff's

Petition discuss the

issue of whether an attorney can advise his client during a
deposition.

In fact, the jury was told that the Defendant

received advise.

The only thing that was withheld from the jury

was the specific advise that was given to Dr. Goodman.

In that

respect, Judge Sawaya properly upheld the attorney-client privilege.

The Petitioner refers to the case of Huffman v. Conder,

712 P.2d 216 (Utah 1985).

The Hoffman case definitely stands for

the proposition that attorney-client conversations are privileged.

The only requirement is that the party and the attorney

must have intended the conversation to be privileged and confidential.

Clearly, advise given during a recetes at a deposition

was intended to be confidential.
Finally, it is hard to believe that the petitioner claims
that Dr. Goodman was told to change his answer or to answer
untruthfully.

As can be seen from a review of the deposition,

Dr. Goodman consistently denied that he had ever authorized any
refills of the prescription.
was asked was hypothetical.

The context of the question that
After the brief recess at the

deposition, Dr. Goodman continued to give the same consistent
answers as he had done before the recess.
change his testimony.

At no time did he

To imply defense counsel convinced his

client to perjure himself as has been argued by Petitioner is
offensive and inappropriate.

The Utah Court of Appeals considered Petitioner's argument.
The Court determined that the conversation between Dr. Goodman
and his counsel was privileged pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
S 78-24-8(2) (1987).

Further, the Court noted that Mr.

Quistberg's counsel did not act on his objections to what
transpired at the deposition until the trial.

He did not file a

Motion to Compel under Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court of Appeals properly found that "contrary to appellant's
repeated mischaracterizations, Goodman was not on the verge of
admitting that he had authorized refills for Quistberg when
Slagle took him out for consultation.

He was being asked a hypo-

thetical question about whether he would have authorized refills
if he had been contacted by the pharmacist, which called for a
simple yes or no response.

After interruption by Slagle,

Appellant's counsel repeated the question and Goodman answered
•yes,' the response Appellant had presumably wanted."
C.

The Petitioner's Claimed Errors in the Instructions to the
Jury Do Not Constitute a Basis for Granting Certiorari.
The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in

refusing to give certain requested instructions.

The Court of

Appeals refused to reverse the decision in the trial court based
on that claim because the Petitioner had not voiced adequate
objections or exceptions pursuant to Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure,

To begin with, the jury was adequately instructed

in

this case.

The instructions requested, which were refused, were

merely more detailed instructions concerning Plaintiff's theories

of negligence.

Since the jury did find that Dr. Goodman was

negligent, then the fact that the Plaintiff's requested instructions numbered 5 and 6 were not given made no difference.
With regard to Requested Instruction 7A, Which is attached
to the Petition as Appendix 0, the Court will r^ote that the
instruction is a distorted attempt to allow the Plaintiff to rely
on the doctor's advise.

There was not adequate evidence at the

trial to support this jury instruction and there was no argument
by Plaintiff that it was a proper statement of the law in the
State of Utah.

The only exception taken to Instruction 7A is set

forth on page 817 of the record wherein it say^:

"Instruction

number 6 exception, it spells out the duty of the doctor, in
appropriate circumstances to monitor the progress of his patient
while using a controlled substance.

The same exception for

Instruction 7A."
The Court of Appeals referred to the decision of E. A.
Strout W. Realty v. W. C. Fov & Sons, 665 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1983).
The Court noted that Appellant voiced no objections in the trial
court to the correctness or completeness of th£ instructions that
were actually given to the jury.

Objections must be sufficiently

specific to give the trial court notice of the claimed error.
This issue was fully and completely dealt with by the Utah
Court of Appeals and that decision should not pe disturbed here,
since there is no reason set forth in the Plaintiff's Petition
demanding any such attention.

CONCLUSION
The Utah Court of Appeals included its opinion with the
following statement:
The judgment is affirmed. Because we conclude that
this appeal is frivolous, appellees1 request for
sanctions pursuant to Utah Rules Appellate Procedure 33
is granted. Appellees Goodman and Bryner Clinic are
awarded double costs on appeal.
The journey that the parties in this case have made to this
point has been long, tedious and expensive.

The claimed negli-

gent events took place in 1982. The Defendant has been forced to
endure eight years of protracted litigation as a result of the
Plaintiff's own misconduct.

It is time that this dispute be put

to rest.
For these reasons, Dr. Gerald N. Goodman and the Bryner
Clinic respectfully request that the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari be denied.
DATED this

~7 day of August, 1990.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
By^
A
David W. Slagle
Attorneys for Defend^rft/
Respondent Gerald N. Goodman
and Bryner Clinic
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
SS.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

David W. Slagle, being duly sworn, says that he is employed
by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys
for respondents Goodman and Bryner Clinic herein; that he served
the attached RESPONDENTS', GERALD N. GOODMAN AND BRYNER CLINIC'S
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI (Supreme
Court No. 880472, Court of Appeals No. 890270-CA, In the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah) upon the parties listed below by
placing four (4) true and correct copies therepf in an envelope
addressed to:
Samuel King, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
2120 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid,
on the H
day of August, 1990.

D<5Vid W. Slagle
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

day of August,

1990.

NOTARY PUBLIC
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My Commission Expires:

